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I.

INTRODUCTION

The explosion of toxic tort and environmental litigation has
virtually flooded courtrooms throughout the country in recent
years. By all accounts, this trend will continue for many years.
Through the active efforts of environmental and consumer
groups, federal, state and local agencies dealing with occupational and environmental health, and public and private industrial hygiene organizations, our society is laying the legal
groundwork for perhaps the next two or three decades.' Vast
arrays of literature are now available to provide scientists, ex* Mr. Cohen is a Litigation Principal of Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C.,
Morristown, New Jersey, and New York, New York. He is a team leader in the
firm's Product Liability and Toxic Tort Litigation Department, Chair of the New
Jersey State Bar Association's Product Liability and Toxic Tort Committee, and a
Certified Civil Trial Attorney by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
** Ms. Mindnich is a litigation associate of the firm.
I State and federal agencies are actively working to identify toxic waste sites
and assess clean up programs. At present, there are approximately 422 hazardous
waste sites in New Jersey. See NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENvTL. PROTECTION 1989 Status
Report on the Hazardous Waste Management Program in New Jersey (Oct. 1989). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified 988 priority Superfund sites
across the country, with 99 of them located in New Jersey. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300, app. B (1990) (national priorities list by rank). See also Occupational Disease in New Jersey Report to the
New Jersey Department of Health, Div. of Envtl. and Occupational Medicine, Dep't of
Community Medicine, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine (1989). This study may well be
representative of industrially mature states. In December of 1989, a nine-month
evaluation of occupational disease in New Jersey analyzed the best available data on
the extent of work-related disease in NewJersey, and reported that between 2,170
and 2,870 deaths and approximately 7,317 to 14,776 new cases arise each year from
occupational exposures to hazardous substances. Id. at i. The report also noted
that the estimated figures were probably lower than the actual incidence of occupationally related diseases, and that there was a serious lack of information available
on the potential toxicity of approximately 80% of the 48,000 chemical substances
in use today. Id. at i, 2. See also North, OccupationalRespiratory Diseases, The Big Four,
SAFETY AND HEALTH 40 (Sept. 1989) (identifying air-borne asbestos, silica, lead and
carbon monoxide as the four largest sources of occupational disease).

1009

1010

SE TON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:1009

perts and lawyers2 with background information about potentially
toxic substances.
Within this framework, lawyers must represent plaintiffs and
defendants in personal injury, wrongful death and property damage claims resulting from exposure to toxic or hazardous substances. Whether the cases involve groundwater contamination
or occupational exposure to hazardous substances, the cases will
invariably require the use of scientific, technical or medical experts to deal with the increasingly complex issues.' These issues
range widely and may include such topics as the causal relationship between exposure to a certain toxic substance and a particular injury, the scientific understanding of certain biological
systems, or the scientific knowledge available to a defendant or
industry at a particular time.
The presentation of scientific evidence and the use of expert
witness testimony is crucial to the litigation of complex toxic tort
and environmental cases. Issues related to the use and abuse of
expert witness testimony, including questions of appropriate
qualifications and the admissibility of scientific evidence and
novel scientific theories, have led to widespread disagreement by
courts and commentators on how to handle the expert testimony.
Recommended proposals contemplate drastic changes in the
legal system, including the implementation of an expanded judicial role,4 a redesign of the jury system in complex cases,' and
From the environmental standpoint, see ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE FROM
CHEMICALS (Neely & Blau, ed. 1985); P. HOWARD, HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
2

FATE AND EXPOSURE DATA FOR ORGANIC CHEMICALS (1989); J. MONTGOMERY & L.
WELKOM, GROUNDWATER CHEMICALS DESK REFERENCE (1990). From the occupational exposure standpoint, see generally PROCTORE, HUGHES & FISCHMAN, CHEMICAL
HAZARDS OF THE WORKPLACE, (1988); N. SAx & R. LEWIS, SR., DANGEROUS PROPERTIES OF INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS (1989); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
REGISTRY OF TOXIC EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AND USER'S GUIDE (1988);
SUSPECT CHEMICALS SOURCEBOOK: A GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS COVERED
UNDER MAJOR REGULATORY AND ADVISORY PROGRAMS (1990). This reference list is

by no means complete, but it will provide the reader with a source of information.
3 See, e.g., Ott, Teta & Greenberg, Assessment of Exposure to Chemicals in a Complex
Work Environment, 16 AM.J. OF INDUS. MED. 617 (1989) (complexities in a retrospective occupational hazardous substance exposure study include imprecise estimates
of exposure levels, variations in personal work practices, lack of understanding of
cancer causation mechanism and the evaluation of the effects of multiple chemical
exposures in cancer causation).
4 See Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 JURIMETRICS J.
245 (1986) (proposing an amendment to FED. R. EVID. 702 which would require the
court to evaluate expert witness testimony on novel scientific evidence and allow
the testimony when the probative value of the testimony exceeds the danger of
confusion, prejudice or delay); Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony,
39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986) (advocating five steps for courts to take in determining
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the use of independent scientific boards6 to decide issues of expert qualifications and the reliability of scientific expert
testimony.
Most of the caselaw and commentary on the presentation
and admissibility of expert witness testimony on novel scientific
evidence has dealt with toxic exposures in the product liability
rather than environmental context. In contrast, this article will
provide the practitioner with an overview of the types of expert
witnesses generally utilized in both types of litigation, and a discussion of the standards for qualification of particular experts, a
review of recent court decisions concerning the admissibility of
scientific expert witness opinion testimony, and a review of some
scientific studies which may be utilized to establish causation in
toxic tort cases.
II.

THE TYPES OF EXPERTS

The complex scientific issues involved in toxic tort and environmental hazardous substance litigation require the attorney to
call upon experts who are highly specialized in particular scientific and medical areas. Expert witnesses serve as interpreters
and translate specialized knowledge into knowledge of common
understanding to enable ordinary lay persons to comprehend
and decide complex issues which jurors ordinarily would not
the admissibility of expert witness testimony); Elliot, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U.L. REV. 487 (1989)
(suggesting a rule allowing the court to appoint a "peer review expert" to evaluate
proffered expert testimony when there exists substantial doubt concerning the acceptability of the proffered testimony by other experts in the field); Johnston, CourtAppointed Scientific Expert Witnesses: UnfetteringExpertise, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 249 (1987)
(stating several proposals for increasing the role of court appointed scientific
experts).
5 See Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially QualifiedJuries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping With the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L.
REV. 887 (1981) (proposing "special" juries for complex civil cases, consisting of
jurors which meet certain minimum educational standards, or alternatively, "expert" non-jury tribunal consisting of judges with the requisite legal and technical
training to comprehend and decide the issues); Schwartz, There is No Archbishop of
Science-A Comment on Elliot's "Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for
RegulatingScientific Evidence," 69 B.U.L. REV. 517 (1989) (rejecting judicial screening
of proffered novel scientific evidence because it usurps the fact finding function of
the jury).
6 Breni.an, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in
Hazardous-SubstanceLitigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469 (1988) (advocates the use of
a Federal Hazardous Substance Science Panel consisting of scientists, business representatives, consumers and workers to make exposure, risk and causation
findings).
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understand. 7
In cases involving toxic substance contamination or exposure, expert witnesses are usually considered essential to provide
opinions on causation, health issues, medical surveillance techniques and requirements, air and groundwater contamination,
and clean-up assessments. The scientific professionals who are
capable of proffering such evidence include, but are not limited
to, biologists, chemists, civil engineers, chemical engineers, epidemiologists, geologists, hydrologists, industrial hygienists, toxicologists and physicians.
Each area of expertise raises a variety of issues in areas of
expert qualifications, substantive admissibility of the expert's
opinion and relevancy. For instance, there is a dispute over
whether certain experts should be permitted to testify at all.' In
addressing these issues, therefore, it is essential to have a basic
working knowledge concerning the scope of the various scientific
disciplines. Biology is the study of the science of living organisms, 9 and the biologist often offers testimony on the adverse
effects of hazardous substances on living organisms. Chemistry
is the scientific study of the properties, composition and structure of matter;' 0 thus a chemist would address the effects which
hazardous substance contamination would have on the structure
and composition of matter, and the matter's accompanying
atomic energy changes. Alternatively, expert witness opinions
may be required on issues which involve a hybrid of the biology
7 For a general discussion on expert testimony and its use in the legal system,
see Expert Opinion Testimony: Experts, Where Did They Come From and Why Are They Here?,
13 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 103 (1989).

8 See Epstein & Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony in Product Liability
Actions, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 656 (1987) (general discussion on abuse of expert
testimony with respect to "junk science" evidence and methods available under
New Jersey law to combat the abuse); Rothstein & Crew, When Should the Judge Keep
Expert Testimony From the Jury?, INSIDE LITGATION 19 (Apr. 1987); Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States A Ha-Centuy Later, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) (rejects the Frye "general acceptance" test for admissibility of expert testimony in favor of proof that the novel scientific evidence or
technique is valid beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases and valid by a preponderance of the evidence in civil cases). See also Griffith, Strain & Black, Dare We
Trust the Jury?, THE BRIEF 6 (Fall 1988) (Griffith argues that the jury is competent to
evaluate conflicting scientific evidence; Strain and Black maintain that the court
should evaluate the validity, accuracy and reliability of the scientific evidence and
exclude that testimony which is not in accord with an established science); Imwinkelried, Science Takes the Stand: The Growing Misuse of Expert Testimony, 26 SCIENCE
20 (1986).
9 McGRAw-HILL, DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 99 (1984).
10 Id. at 163.
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and chemistry sciences. Biochemistry is the study of the chemical
substances which occur in living organisms, the processes by
which the substances enter into or are formed in the organisms
and react with each other and the environment, and the methods
by which the substances and processes are identified, characterized and measured." The biochemist will often testify about the
reaction and resultant effects of the interplay between chemical
substances and the human body.
When litigating issues involving hazardous substances in the
environment, it is also vital to determine the impact that the substances have upon the surrounding atmosphere and environment. To provide evidence of such adverse effects, the attorney
often will seek the expertise of civil engineers, geologists and hydrologists. Because civil engineering typically involves the planning, design and construction of fixed structures, 1 2 the civil
engineer could offer testimony on the changes in a building's
structural stability as a result of soil erosion and movement due
to hazardous substance contamination. Geology involves the
study of the earth, including the weathering, erosion and sedimentation of soil.' 3 Thus a geologist may offer testimony on the
effects of hazardous substance contamination on the earth. On
the other hand, hydrology is the study of the surface and ground
waters of the earth, and includes analysis of the water's occurrence, circulation and distribution, its chemical and physical
properties, and the water's reaction with the environment.' 4 The
hydrologist will often offer testimony on ground water migration,
based upon soil and water samples which show that contaminants
entering the environment have migrated to different areas.
An industrial hygienist is another specially trained, science
professional often called as an expert witness in an occupational
exposure case to testify about industrial hygiene conditions or
practices. The industrial hygienist's evidence would typically
concern the health aspects of exposure to indoor air pollution
and the analytical techniques used to quantify the extent of toxic
substance exposure upon an individual. 1 5 In toxic tort cases the
'
12

IId. at 98.

14 McGRAw-HILL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 4 (1982).
13 McGRAw-HILL, DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 401 (1984).
14 Id. at 458.
15 Industrial hygienists evaluate various factors to determine the risk implications of exposure to toxic substances. These factors range widely but typically include the substance's toxicity, the amount of a toxic substance to which a person is
exposed, the duration and frequency of exposure, the method of exposure (inges13
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witnesses most frequently used for expert testimony are epidemiologists, toxicologists and physicians. Familiarity with these disciplines is essential to understand the role that the experts play in
the litigation process.
Epidemiology involves the study of the distribution and causation of diseases in groups of people.16 Of significant interest in
toxic substance litigation are those epidemiologic studies of
human populations which correlate the incidence of disease with
measured exposures to toxic agents. 17 Typically, epidemiological studies involve a cohort evaluation of a study group and a
control group. The study group would consist of individuals who
were exposed to the toxic agent, while the control group would
consist of unexposed individuals. This is a prospective study
wherein the groups are randomly selected and observed over a
period of time, often years, to compare the development, or lack
thereof, of a particular abnormality associated with a toxic substance. The epidemiologist's testimony would reveal the findings
of the cohort studies, and identify the causal relationship, if any,
between exposure to the particular toxic substance and the resultant injury or illness.
Encompassing the study of the deleterious effects of chemicals and physical agents on organic systems, toxicology includes
the identification of the stimulating agent as well as the means to
prevent and treat negative responses to the exposure.' 8 The toxtion, inhalation, or skin contact) and the presence of other toxic substances which
might cause similar effects. Industrial hygienists can also evaluate the effects of
environmental factors, such as ventilation and temperature, which may increase or
decrease the extent of the exposure. For a general discussion on the industrial
hygienist in toxic substance cases, see Imbus, Buncher, Dyson, Thomas & Nothstein,
Health Professionals as Experts, Toxic TORTS, LITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
CASES 553 (1984) [hereinafter Imbus]. For a comprehensive list of chemical substances and acceptable exposure values, see 1990-1991 Threshold Limit Values for
Chemical Substances in the Work Environment, AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INDUSTRIAL HYGIENISTS; 1990-1991 Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances
and Physical Agents and Biological Exposure Indices, AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INDUSTRIAL HYGIENISTS.
16 A good overview of the epidemiologist's role in the legal process can be

found in Imbus, supra note 15, at 561 and Enterline, The Role of Epidemiology and

Biostatisticsin Toxic Substances Litigation, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION 126 (1988).
17 Id. See also Barnes & Conley, Statistical Evidence in Litigation: Methodology, Procedure, and Practice (Supp. 1989); Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984); Heafey, Trial by Lottery: The Misuse of
Epidemiology and Statistics to Prove Causation in Drug and Chemical Litigation, 38 DEF. L.J.
673, 674 (Dec. 1989).
18 14 McGRAw-HILL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 4 (1982). For
a general discussion on toxicologists and expert witness testimony, see INDUSTRIAL
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icologist will often testify on the chemical characteristics of a
toxic substance, the extent to which the substance could invade
human beings and the environment and the substance's toxic effect. The toxicology field is divided into sub-disciplines with the
three major sub-disciplines consisting of (1) environmental toxicology, (2) clinical toxicology and (3) forensic toxicology.
Environmental toxicology concerns the study of those agents
which are purposely or accidentally added to food products, air,
water and soil. Environmental toxicology also studies toxic
agents which exist in the workplace. The environmental toxicologist identifies contaminating agents to understand their movement in the biosphere, reveal their mechanism of action on biotic
systems, and define the limits of their safe use. Clinical toxicologists are concerned with the clinical management of diseases that
are associated with chemicals of exogenous origin. Forensic toxicology primarily concerns the medicolegal aspects of a chemical's
effects on the human body. Forensic toxicology determines the
circumstances leading up to a cause of death and also plays a significant role in the identification of specific hazards of various
chemicals.
For personal injury claims based on exposure to certain toxic
substances, medical experts will typically testify about the potential causes and effects of exposure to the hazardous substance in
question. Whether the medical expert is a pulmonologist, radiologist, oncologist, cardiologist, epidemiologist or an occupational
health specialist depends on the type of injury or disease. All of
these physicians have the requisite scientific training and knowledge to formulate opinions in causation.' 9 In addition, through
TOXICOLOGY (Williams and Burson, eds. 1985); Imbus, supra note 15, at 573. For a
list of several of the numerous sources available on the existence and toxicity of
various agents in the environment, see supra note 2. See also J. FAWELL & S. HuNT,
ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY: ORGANIC POLLUTANTS (1988); B. CARSON, H. ELLIS &
J.

MCCANN,

TOXICOLOGY AND BIOLOGICAL MONITORING OF METALS

IN HUMANS

(1986).
19 Commentators, however, have long questioned the nature and quality of physicians who give expert medical testimony. See, e.g., Wick & Kightlinger, Impartial
Medical Testimony Under the Federal Civil Rules: A Tale of Three Doctors, 24 INS. COUNS.
L.J. 115, 122 (1967) (advocating impartial expert medical witness, selected by a
medical association, in order to overcome the obvious biases of a party's proffered
expert witness); Van Dusen, The ImpartialMedical Expert System: The Judicial Point of
View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 386 (1961) (federal district judge suggests that the "battle of
the experts" wastes time, money and does not aid the jury in the fact finding mission); Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony: A Way to Better and QuickerJustice, 22 F.R.D.
21 (1959) (former New York Supreme Court justice argues that expert medical witness testimony results in jury receiving confusing, untrustworthy and unreliable
data).
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diagnosis of the plaintiff's condition or disease, the physicians
may testify on the increased risk of disease and the need for medical surveillance of the plaintiff over a stated period. 0 In many
cases, psychologists or psychiatrists may offer valuable testimony
where the plaintiff seeks recovery for "fear of cancer" or other
phobia-based emotional distress damages. 2 '
III.

THE EXPERT'S QUALIFICATIONS

While the qualifications of an expert as a basis for excluding
expert witness testimony have received less attention lately, the
New Jersey case law may be viewed as a microcosm of the national experience in this area. Substantial attention has been
heaped on the 'junk science" phenomenon, and the number of
cases involving complex scientific issues has increased so vastly
that courts have attempted to gain more control over the admissibility of expert witness evidence. A court's initial inquiry ordinarily involves the qualification of the expert witness under the
appropriate rules of evidence. The rules, however, do not establish any express standards by which a trial court can determine
whether the proffered witness has the requisite experience, training or education to qualify as an expert. 2 2 As expected, thejudi20 In both occupational and environmental exposure cases, the issues of increased risk of cancer and medical monitoring costs are most often evaluated by
medical testimony. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 850-51 (3d
Cir. 1990) (a claim for medical monitoring is viable, even absent present indications
of physical injury, if competent expert testimony proves to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that monitoring is necessary to properly diagnose the disease's
warning signs); Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 152326 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (summary judgment granted for defendant because plaintiff's expert medical witnesses could not quantify plaintiff's enhanced risk of disease); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 116 N.J. 126, 139, 561 A.2d 257, 265 (1989) (risk
of future incidence of disease must be established by testimony based on reasonable medical probability); Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 597-99, 525
A.2d 287 (1987) (damages for enhanced risk of contracting cancer denied in the
absence of proof of reasonable medical probability; damages for medical surveillance costs granted due to competent medical testimony establishing surveillance
as an established medical practice); Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 508 Pa. 154,
165 n.5-6, 494 A.2d 1088, 1094 n.5-6 (1985) (possibility of harm inadmissible;
plaintiff must present non-speculative, competent medical evidence).
21 See generally Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 (6th Cir.
1988) (plaintiff allowed recovery for emotional distress suffered because of the fear
of contracting a toxic exposure disease); Mauro, 116 N.J. at 137, 561 A.2d at 263
(plaintiff with physical injury from exposure to toxic chemicals may recover damages for emotional distress when there is a reasonable concern of an enhanced risk
of additional disease).
22 The expert witness qualification standards are found in FED. R. EvID. 702 and
N.J. EvID. R. 19, respectively. Rule 702 provides in full:
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cial decisions on this issue clearly require a case-by-case analysis.
In Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp. ,23 a biochemist with extensive qualifications in the area of cancer research was precluded
from testifying about the causal relationship between colon cancer and PCB exposure because the trial court found that the witness was not a physician and therefore lacked the requisite
education, training and experience in treating cancer patients to
qualify as an expert. 24 On appeal, the court reversed and concluded that the biochemist was qualified to express opinions on
cancer causation and related scientific matters, notwithstanding
that the opinions included medical subjects. The court ruled that
"[d]eficiencies in the qualifications of an expert is a matter to be
weighed by the jury," with appropriate instructions.2 5
Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
FED. R. EviD. 702. The New Jersey expert witness qualification standard provides
in part:
Prerequisites of Personal Knowledge and Experience. As a prerequisite for the testimony of a witness there must be evidence that he has
personal knowledge of the matter, or experience, training, or education, if such be required. Such evidence may be provided by the testimony of the witness himself ....

In exceptional circumstances the

judge may receive the testimony of the witness conditionally, subject
to the evidence of knowledge, experience, training or education being
later supplied in the course of the trial.
N.J. EvID. R. 19. Although the rules fail to provide standards for determining the
adequacy of a witness's proffered qualifications, the commentators' language is certainly geared to a liberal approach. See Mitchell, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: How They Affect Product Liability Practice, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 551, 563-64 (1974)
(Rule 702 expands the scope of political expert witnesses to "any area of 'specialized' knowledge" and expands the scope of when the testimony may be used to
whenever it is "helpful" to the trier of fact); BiUNNO, CURRENT N.J. RULES OF Evi-

DENCE, Comment 3 to Evid. R. 19 (1991) (trial court has broad discretionary power
to allow or exclude expert testimony).
23 242 N.J. Super. 36, 576 A.2d 4 (App. Div. 1990), rev'k, 225 N.J. Super. 485,
542 A.2d 975 (Law Div. 1988).
24 225 N.J. Super. at 493-95, 542 A.2d at 979-80. The trial court found that the
witness was a biochemist with a doctorate in biochemistry and further, that he had
worked as a biochemist for Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research for over
37 years, published extensively on carcinogenesis, and was head of a research
group primarily concerned with investigating the case, treatment and diagnosis of
colon cancer. Id. at 492, 542 A.2d at 979. The court found, however, that the
biochemist never conducted a medical examination of a human patient, never conducted a clinical diagnosis, nor prescribed a recommended course of treatment. Id.
at 493, 542 A.2d at 979.
25 242 N.J. Super. at 48, 576 A.2d at 10. The appellate court noted that the
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In Landrigan v. Celotex Corp. ,26 the plaintiff produced an epidemiologist/biostatistician to testify on the causal relationship
between the decedent's exposure to asbestos and the decedent's
resulting colon cancer. The trial judge concluded that the expert
had no qualified medical training and rejected the proffered expert testimony. The appellate court agreed, concluding that the
epidemiologist's expertise was in the statistical study of the occurrence of disease in various population groups, not medicine.
While the witness was qualified to testify as an expert on the
causal relationship between exposure to asbestos and the incidence of colon cancer, the court found that the epidemiologist
was not qualified to testify as to the asbestos being the cause of
the decedent's cancer.2 7
Thus, whether a witness has the appropriate qualifications to
testify as an expert on a particular subject in New Jersey continues to depend on the expert's knowledge, skill and experience in
that area.2 8 Many of the recent Third Circuit decisions show a
more liberal approach toward the qualification of expert witnesses. In the Third Circuit's most recent opinion on this issue,
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation,2 9 the court concluded that
biochemist's experience and educational background possibly rendered him more
qualified as an expert witness than a medical doctor. Id. at 48 n.8, 576 A.2d at 10
n.8.
26 243 N.J. Super. 449, 462, 579 A.2d 1268, 1274 (App. Div. 1990).
27 Landrigan, 243 N.J. Super. at 462-63, 579 A.2d at 1274. The appellate division panel distinguished the physical science qualifications and experience of the
expert in Rubanick, discussed at notes 23-25 and accompanying text, as "materially
different" from those of the proffered expert, whom the court termed a statistician
interested in the subject of carcinogenesis. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying
text; id. at 463, 579 A.2d at 1275. See also Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985) (the Landrigan epidemiologist was allowed to
testify as to the ability of asbestos to cause cancer, but not on whether the asbestos
was the actual medical causative agent for the particular plaintiff).
28 See generally Crespo v. McCartin, 244 N.J. Super. 413, 420-422, 582 A.2d
1011, 1015-16 (App. Div. 1990) (orthopedist was not qualified to render an expert
opinion regarding diagnosis of an ectopic pregnancy because he never practiced
obstetrics or gynecology nor did he ever perform surgery to terminate an ectopic
pregnancy); Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 229 N.J. Super. 230,
240-42, 551 A.2d 177 (App. Div. 1988) (pharmacologist not qualified to render an
opinion on the causal link between ingestion of Bendectin and birth defects because he never conducted Bendectin research, nor examined the plaintiff); Bock v.
American Cyanamid Co., No. L-082158-86, slip op. at 11 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Jul.
3, 1989) (medical doctors precluded from testifying as experts on the effects of
malathion because they lacked knowledge of malathion, its effect on the human
body and whether malathion could possibly be the cause of plaintiff's ailments).
29 916 F.2d 829, 855-56 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting district court's requirement of
specific education or experience to qualify as an expert and holding that FED. R.
EVID. 702 is to be liberally construed). See also, DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
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the trial court had abused its discretion by excluding portions of
testimony from several purported experts. In particular, the testimony of a toxicologist was excluded because she was neither
qualified to testify as a chemist about gas chromatography tracing
nor qualified to testify as a medical doctor on the cause of the
plaintiff's physical injuries."0 The district court also excluded
portions of a microbiologist's testimony on the effects of PCBs
on human beings because the witness was not trained in differential diagnosis, and the testimony of a physicist regarding a study
concerning PCB levels in the American population because of his
curriculum vitae. The circuit court reviewed the witnesses' respective qualifications and concluded that "[i]n light of the liberal Rule 702 expert qualification standard," the experts should
not have been precluded from testifying "simply because the experts did not have the degree or training which the district court
apparently thought would be most appropriate. "31
In another recent third circuit case, DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceutical,Inc. ,32 the district court precluded pediatric pharmacologist testimony that the drug Bendectin caused limb reduction birth defects and that, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, the drug caused the plaintiff's birth deformities. After
careful examination of the witnesses' credentials, the circuit court
concluded that a witness should not be precluded from testifying
as an expert simply because of the absence of a particular degree,
tical, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 953 (3d Cir. 1990) (the inquiry into proffered expert witness' qualifications involves liberal criteria); Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893
F.2d 49, 51-53 (3d Cir. 1990). Cf. Trustees of Univ. of Pa. v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
815 F.2d 890, 903 (3d Cir. 1987) (although trial court has broad discretion in determining an expert's qualifications, proffered insurance claim examiner was rightfully excluded from rendering expert opinion because the examiner had no
experience with large damage claims).
30 In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855.
31 Id. at 856. A petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was
recently denied. See General Electric Co. v. Knight, 111 S.Ct. 1584 (1991). See
also Habecker, 893 F.2d at 49 (3d Cir. 1990) (non-engineer safety specialist, with a
master's degree in safety education, and a doctorate degree in human factors design and product safety design, permitted to testify on whether the forklift manufacturer's failure to equip the forklift with seat belts caused the operator's death).
Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1982) (expert allowed to testify in a product liability case involving lack of a rollover protective
structure on tractors, although his only qualifications were teaching high school
automobile repair and some automotive and agricultural equipment sales experience); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (safety engineer
permitted to render expert opinion on whether unguarded elevator control buttons
constituted a design defect, regardless of the fact that he was not a design engineer
familiar with elevators or their components).
32 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'g, 131 F.R.D. 71 (D.N.J. 1989).
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the witness' experience, knowledge and
without also considering
35
specific training.
This brief overview of Third Circuit and New Jersey case law
indicates that there are many avenues which a witness can travel
to obtain sufficient expert witness qualifications. Both formal education and practical experience can suffice to qualify an individual as an expert, even absent particularized experience. 4
Professional witnesses will not be excluded3 5 nor will an expert
who is a party or an interested party be excluded for these reasons alone.36 Expert witnesses may even testify outside of their
field of expertise when there is a logical nexus between the expert's field of expertise and the elicited testimony. 7 In short,
there are no mechanical rules or objective standards upon which
to evaluate an expert's qualifications. The judicial trend, however, certainly appears to be in favor of admissibility as long as
the expert's qualifications comply with the broad language of the
applicable evidence rule.
33 911 F.2d at 953.
34 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 865 F.2d 164, 168 (8th Cir. 1988) (public
health inspector with a degree in journalism qualified as expert witness on sexually
transmitted disease because of over eight years experience investigating and managing sexually transmitted disease cases); Davis v. American Jet Leasing, Inc., 864
F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1988) (licensed pilot with maintenance and repair supervisory experience was qualified to render expert opinion on defendant's aircraft
maintenance and inspection program); Loudermill v. Dow Chemical Co., 863 F.2d
566, 568-69 (8th Cir. 1988) (toxicologist with extensive experience in determining
toxicological effects and relation to death was allowed to render expert opinion on
causal link between chemical exposure and liver failure, notwithstanding that expert was not a medical doctor); Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F.2d 66, 69 n.15 (5th
Cir. 1988) (expert's knowledge, experience, education or training is the critical factor, not the degree held by the expert); DaSilva v. American Brands, Inc., 845 F.2d
356, 361 (1st Cir. 1988); Exum v. General Electric Co., 819 F.2d 1158, 1163 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Dixon v. Int'l Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1985); Frazier
v. Continental Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 1978).
35 ThomasJ. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791, 799-800 (4th Cir. 1989)
(status of professional expert witness does not mandate exclusion of testimony);
Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988) (witness cannot be
excluded from testifying simply because the witness spends much of the time consulting with trial attorneys and testifying).
36 See, e.g., Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1042 (7th Cir. 1988)
(plaintiff, an expert in the evaluation of statistical evidence in employment discrimination actions, allowed to testify as expert witness in his own employment discrimination case).
37 See, e.g., Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990) (experimental psychologist was permitted to testify as expert witness concerning escalator
design, limited to the actions of young children with regard to red stop buttons).
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IV.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY

There is one general proposition with which most courts and
commentators will agree - if a witness is qualified as an expert,
the expert's testimony will be admissible when (1) the expert's
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue,"" and (2) the "facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference ... [are] . . . of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." 9 The inquiry, therefore, is whether the expert witness opinion will help
the jury to understand the issues and whether the expert's opinion is reliable.
In most instances, expert testimony will assist the jury in its
determinations, unless the circumstances of the case are extraordinary. 40 A review of the case law reveals a clear tendency
toward allowing the expert's opinion even if the testimony only
permits the jury to focus their collective common sense. Therefore, the emphasis in almost all cases dealing with scientific evidence, novel theories and "junk science" is the reliability of the
expert witness testimony. Reliability can be challenged by attacking the underlying scientific data used by the expert in forming
an opinion or the manner in which the scientific data is utilized
by the expert.4 ' The use of in limine hearings to evaluate the reli38 FED. R. EvID. 702. The Federal Rules of Evidence and New Jersey Evidence
Rule 56(2) are identical in all relevant respects.
39 FED. R. EVID. 703. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 56(2) of the New
Jersey Rules of Evidence are identical in all relevant respects.
40 Expert testimony will normally be allowed if the subject is beyond the average
person's "ordinary experience, education, and knowledge," State v. Odom, 116
N.J. 65, 71, 560 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1989), or if the testimony is "so esoteric that
jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment" on the
issue in question. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283, 445 A.2d 1141,
1147 (1982). See, e.g., Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 121 N.J. 276, 579 A.2d 1241
(1990) (product defects); Lesniak v. County of Bergen, 117 N.J. 12, 31, 563 A.2d

795, 805 (1989) (extent of permanent injury or disability); State v. Zola, 112 N.J.
384, 412, 548 A.2d 1022, 1036 (1988) (serologists); Rosenberg by Rosenberg v.
Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325, 492 A.2d 371, 374 (1985) (medical malpractice); Tenore v.
Nu Car Carriers, 67 N.J. 466, 483-84, 341 A.2d 613, 622-23 (1975) (economists);
Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36, 576 A.2d 4 (App. Div. 1990)
(toxicologist); Motor Finance Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Tax, 129 N.J. Super. 19, 25, 322
A.2d 180, 183 (App. Div. 1974), cert. denied, 66 N.J. 319, 331 A.2d 19 (1974) (testi-

mony from accountants).
41 See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954 (3d Cir.
1990) (Federal Rules of Evidence do not require that the expert accept the conclu-

sions of a study if the expert wishes merely to utilize the study's underlying data to
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ability of scientific expert witness testimony on complex scientific
hazardous substance and toxic tort issues has become the subject
of some judicial disagreement.4 2 While there is general agreement that courts must carefully review the qualifications and reliability of a proffered expert witness in accordance with the rules
of evidence, there is substantial disagreement on the manner and
standards of review which are to be utilized in performing the
review.
A.

Who Decides-Judgeor Jury?

An initial controversy surrounds the issue of who should decide questions on the validity and reliability of proffered scientific
evidence. In the last ten years, two schools of judicial thought
have evolved on whether the judge or the jury should decide
these questions.
One school clearly believes that such issues should be left to
the jury to decide. This approach was initially discussed in Ferebee
v. Chevron Chemical Co. , which involved the admissibility of expert testimony to establish a causal connection between paraquat
exposure and pulmonary fibrosis. Both the plaintiff's and defendant's experts relied on diagnostic methodology; the experts
differed, however, on the conclusions to be drawn from the test
results and other data.44 The Circuit Court of the District of Coformulate conclusions); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir.
1985) (acceptance of scientific technique by a certain percentage of the scientific
community is a factor, rather than a prerequisite, in determining admissibility).
Note, however, that Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence still requires the
evidence to serve its ultimate purpose without "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." FED. R. EVID. 403. Many courts believe that if the expert testimony survives scrutiny under Rules 702 and 703, it
should not be excluded under Rule 403. See In re Paoli, 916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d Cir.
1990).
42 The Third Circuit has held that "where there are numerous experts presenting voluminous testimony on the cutting edge of scientific research, an in limine
hearing may be a very useful tool in conducting both the inquiry and the fact finding and balancing, which are the hallmarks of Rules 703 and 403 respectively." In
re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 859. On the other hand, several courts in New Jersey have
expressed reservations about the use of in limine hearings to decide evidentiary matters, and have instead favored a Rule 8 hearing on the issue during the trial. N.J.
EvID. R. 8. See Rubanick, 242 N.J Super. at 46, 576 A.2d at 9 (favoring N.J. EvID. R.
8 hearing because the in limine hearing was too extensive and caused the trial judge
to become the fact-finder, instead of the jury); Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J.
Super. 457, 464 (App. Div. 1988) (advocating cautious and infrequent use of in
limine hearings because the hearings are frequently conducted in the abstract without a concrete factual basis).
43 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
44 Id. at 1535.
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lumbia refused to analyze the experts' conclusions, asserting
that:
Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence
to resolve the complex and refractory causal issues raised by
the attempt to link low-level exposure to toxic chemicals with
human disease. On questions such as these, which stand at the
frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, ifexperts are willing to testfy that such a 45link exists, it is for the jury to
decide whether to credit such testimony.

Thus, the court perceived the case as a "classic battle of the experts,
a battle in which the jury must decide the victor."4 6 This "leave it to
the jury" approach has also been recognized in other jurisdictions.4 7
Both the Third Circuit4 s and the New Jersey courts 4 9 appear to be
leaning in the direction of allowing juries to decide these issues provided the prerequisite expert witness qualification standards have
been met.
Id. at 1534 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1535. See also Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745
(1 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986) (district court judge, as fact-finder
in non-jury trial, had burden of choosing the victor in the "battle of the experts").
47 See Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1990),
reh'g en banc granted, 914 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1990) (proper deference should be accorded to the jury's role as factfinder when there are conflicting expert opinions;
questions relating to the source and basis of an expert's opinion go to the credibility of the opinion, rather than its admissibility, and should be left to thejury); Wells,
788 F.2d at 745 (if the trier of fact finds sufficient evidence of causation in a legal
sense, i.e., to a reasonable degree of certainty, it does not matter that the medical
community may require more research, studies and evidence prior to conclusively
resolving the question); Lanzilotti v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., WL 7832
(E.D. Pa. Jul. 10, 1986) (a classic battle of the experts boils down to the issue of
credibility, a matter which is to be resolved by the jury).
48 In In re Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
groundssub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986),
the Third Circuit held:
Moreover, the suggestion that the court must, in deciding on admissibility, carefully scrutinize the underlying assumptions, the inferences
drawn, and the conclusions reached, if followed rigorously, would result in the trial court, as distinguished from the fact-finder, deciding
the weight to be given to the testimony .... The jury is intelligent
enough, aided by counsel, to ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations .... The question whether such an opinion will be helpful to
the jury involves discretion, but that discretion must be exercised consistent with the presumption that expert testimony will be helpful.
In re Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d at 279 (citations omitted). See also Knight v.
Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 86-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (trial court's exclusion of expert testimony invaded the jury's factfinding function).
49 See, e.g., Rubanick v. Witco chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36, 48, 576 A.2d 4
(App. Div. 1990) (the jury must determine the weight, credibility and probative
value of the expert witness's testimony).
45
46
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The second school of thought on the question of who decides
expert scientific evidence reliability and validity issues calls for the
court to decide. Various judges have taken a very active role in
holding medical experts to court-fashioned threshold scientific standards. One of the most renowned cases where this threshold was
applied, In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,5" involved the
health effects of low-level dioxin (Agent Orange) exposure to Vietnam veterans. The defendant chemical manufacturers moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs' scientific
proofs were insufficient to prove causation.
The court recognized the two general approaches to applying
certain rules of evidence-liberal and strict-and adopted the more
restrictive approach. 5 1 The court held that in cases where the presentation of theories of causation depended almost entirely upon expert testimony, a "rigorous examination" of the expert opinions was
especially important.5 2 The court further opined that such careful
scrutiny of proposed evidence was especially appropriate in the
toxic tort area, stating that "[t]he uncertainty of the evidence in such
cases, dependent as it is upon speculative scientific hypotheses and
epidemiological studies, creates a special need for robust screening
of experts and gate-keeping under [Rules] 403 and 703 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] by the court."5 " Thus, under this interpretation of the applicable rules of evidence, certain courts will carefully
scrutinize the evidence prior to allowing its presentation to the trier
of fact. This strict approach, requiring the trial court to make a detailed, substantive, scientific inquiry into the admissibility of expert
testimony, has been followed in several other jurisdictions.5 4
50 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chemical Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
51 Id. at 1243-44. The restrictive view would require the trial court judge to
ascertain whether the underlying scientific data was "untrustworthy" for reasons of
hearsay and other similar admissibility reasons. In addition, the trial court would
have to decide whether the data which the expert opinion was based upon was the
type reasonably relied on by other experts in the field. Id. at 1244. In contrast, the
liberal view requires that the trial court determine merely that the underlying data
is the type reasonably relied upon by other experts in the field. Id.
52 Id. at 1244.
53 Id. at 1260.
54 See Head v. Lithonia Corp., 881 F.2d 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1989) (the court's
preliminary determination on admissibility of expert testimony necessarily should
focus on the foundation for the opinion and its reliability); Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 218 (1989) (whether an expert witness opinion has an adequate factual basis
should be decided by the court as a matter of law); Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.,
826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (trial court may investigate the foundation and
reliability of the expert's opinion); Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 646 F.
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B.

The Standards of Review-

The admissibility of scientific evidence by way of expert witness testimony cannot depend upon solely the rules of evidence
because such rules provide no definitive guidelines on admissibility other than that the "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence ' 5 5 and that the "facts or data ... [be] of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field."5 " Analysis on the
subject of admissibility of expert testimony concerning novel scientific theories would not be complete without a review of these
two critical areas.
1.

The Standard of Reasonable Reliance on the
Underlying Data or Study

Courts have differed on whether support for determining an
expert's reasonable reliance on certain facts or data should come
from the court or the expert when there is a question of admissibility. The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently addressed this
precise issue in a case involving a swimming pool diving accident.5 7 The plaintiff brought a product liability action alleging
design defect and inadequate warning against the pool manufacturer. The manufacturer's expert testified that the pool was constructed according to the industry's residential pool standards,
and that there was no need for warnings. The expert's opinion
was based on reports from various spinal cord injury centers, information obtained through interviews with injured persons, and
information from interviews with diving board manufacturers
and fabricators of similar swimming pools.
When the trial court inquired as to the reliability of this information, the expert conceded that he did not verify it, and that
the manufacturers may have under-reported the number of
Supp. 856, 864 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (courts must
examine the data upon which the expert witness opinion testimony will be based to
ascertain whether the data is the type that is typically relied upon by other experts
in the field and whether reliance on that data is reasonable); Marder v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd without opinion, 814 F.2d 655
(4th Cir. 1987) (court's evaluation of expert's proffered testimony must ensure that
there is a basis, beyond mere speculation, and theory for the opinion); Johnston v.
United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 415 (D. Kan. 1984) (court must evaluate expert's
credibility and trustworthiness, which includes evaluating the scientific view and its
acceptance in the scientific community).
55 See FED. R. EVID. 702; N.J. EvID. R. 19, 56(2).
56 See FED. R. EvID. 703; NJ. EVID. R. 56(2).
57 Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 121 N.J. 276, 579 A.2d 1241 (1990).
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swimming pool related injuries. The expert asserted that the
data upon which he based his opinion was the same data utilized
by the Consumer Product Safety Commission in the formulations
of swimming pool standards. Thus, the expert concluded that it
was reasonable to rely on these types of data in formulating an
expert opinion. Based upon the findings in the New Jersey Evidence Rule 8 hearing, the trial court ruled that it would not permit the expert to advise the jury as"to the number of diving injury
incidents. The trial court found that the data which the expert
had used as the basis for his opinion was "relatively vague" and
would unduly prejudice the plaintiff.58
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to determine whether an acknowledged expert witness' opinion was
admissible if it were shown that the opinion was based on potentially unreliable data, but that the data was of the type regularly
relied upon by experts in the field in rendering opinions. The
court acknowledged that the language of New Jersey Rule of Evidence 56(2) mirrored that of Federal Rule 703, which required
the following two inquiries: "(1) do experts in the field in fact
rely upon [these] kinds of facts or data? and -(2) if so, is their
reliance reasonable? ' 59 The answer to the first inquiry, the
Court found, was typically obtained from the experts themselves,
applicable literature in the field, and by judicial notice. As to the
second query, the Court noted that an expert could not be allowed to ratify the reasonableness of his reliance on the underlying data and asserted the need for judicial inquiry and findings
regarding whether experts in the given field rely on certain information. If so, then reliance on the underlying data would be presumed to be reasonable. Moreover, the court stated that "[t]he
focus should be on what the experts in fact rely on, not on
whether the court thinks they should so rely."'6 Accordingly,
58 Id. at 282, 579 A.2d at 1244. The appellate division affirmed and stated that
the expert's opinion was properly excluded under Rule 56(2) because the data was
too unreliable and vague. Id. at 283, 579 A.2d at 1244.
59 Id. at 287, 579 A.2d at 1247 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 15, at 3
(1984 & Supp. 1987)
60 Id. at 289, 579 A.2d at 1248. See Grassis v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 248 N.J.
Super. 446, 591 A.2d 671 (App. Div. 1991). ("courts should be loath to determine
whether the particular expert has properly relied upon data which experts in the
field generally rely upon"); In re Japanese Elect. Prod., 723 F.2d 238, 276-77 (3d
Cir. 1983) (when making a Rule 703 analysis to determine the underlying basis of
an expert's opinion, the proper inquiry is what experts in the relevant field deem to
be reliable, not what the court determines reliable to mean); Indian Coffee Corp. v.
Procter & Gamble, 752 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985)
(district courts committed reversible error in failing to make finding as to the types
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although certain data may be potentially unreliable, the expert
opinion based on that data is admissible if experts in the field
regularly rely on those types of data.
2.

Is the Expert Witness Opinion Reliable?

This question is by far the most interesting and difficult for
courts to grasp and resolve because challenges typically go to
either the reliability of the underlying data itself or the manner in
which the expert has used the data. The challenged data is most
often epidemiological studies, or animal studies, but may also be
in the form of anecdotal data, data recalculations or analogous
chemical studies. The answer to how courts have resolved these
questions depends on the jurisdiction, the court and the standard
of review exercised by the court.
A renowned standard for the admissibility of expert opinions
concerning scientific evidence is the "general acceptance" test,
first articulated in 1923 by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in the seminal case of Frye v. United States.6 ' The
case hinged on the admissibility of the results of a systolic blood
pressure deception test, which was a novel scientific test in 1923
and a precursor to the lie detector test. The Court of Appeals set
forth the following standard:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a wellrecognized scientific principle or discovery, the thingfrom which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently establishedto have gainedgeneral acceptance in the particularfield in which it belongs.62
Thus, courts which utilized the general acceptance test had to evaluate the status, in the relevant scientific community, of the scientific
foundation for the proffered novel evidence and the usual technique
for applying the scientific principle, in addition to evaluating the
technique used on the particular occasion relevant to the proffered
of data experts find reliable). But see Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498,
504-05 (5th Cir. 1983) (district court's exclusion of expert opinion not reversible
error where the court wanted better foundational data for the opinion).
61 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This short opinion dealing with the systolic
blood pressure test is cited, either favorably or critically, in almost every article or
opinion dealing with the issue of expert witness testimony.
62 Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
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testimony. 63 Once the scientific foundation was generally recognized and accepted by the scientific community, the judicial review
of the foundational requirement was eliminated. The Frye general
acceptance standard was quickly accepted and adopted by a majority
of jurisdictions.64 Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, various courts have tended to reject or modify the
general acceptance test on the grounds that it violates the essence of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which generally provide for the admission of expert testimony whenever it would be helpful to the
trier of fact.65
The general acceptance test has also been rejected because
neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the accompanying advisory committee notes mention this or any other standard for the
admission of novel scientific evidence. 66 In United States v. Downing, 67 one of the leading cases rejecting the general acceptance standard, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the
test suffered from serious flaws, and a more flexible three-step anal63 See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
64 Note, Novel Scientific Evidence: Does Frye Require That GeneralAcceptance Within the
Scientific Community Be Established by DisinterestedScientists?, 65 DET. L. REV. 147, 148
(1987) (approximately two-thirds of the jurisdictions in the United States follow the
Frye standard, or derivations thereof).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (admissibility of scientific evidence depends on the established considerations applicable
to the admissibility of all evidence such as relevance, materiality, reliability, tendency for prejudice or confusion of the jury). For an in depth discussion and criticism of the Frye test, see Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980); United States v.
Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) (court suggested that, unless unduly prejudicial, presentation of relevant scientific evidence
should be allowed and credibility of this evidence can be refuted on cross-examination); State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 12, 273 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1981) (new scientific
evidence can be admitted when its accuracy and reliability have become established
and recognized); Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968),
appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (evidence based on scientific tests is allowed when the tests are recognized and accepted by the scientists in that field or when the test is reasonably demonstrable).

66

See 3 J.

WEINSTEIN AND

M.

BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

02[03], at 702-13

(1990) (the failure of Rule 702 and the Advisory Committee Notes to mention the
Frye decision manifests a rejection of the general acceptance rule); 22 C. WRIGHT &

K.

GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 5168, at 86-90 (1978) (criticizing

Frye and concluding that the Federal Rules of Evidence repealed the general acceptance rule); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1242
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 818 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234
(1988) (the Frye general acceptance standard has been replaced by the Federal
Rules of Evidence balancing test the reliability, relevance, and usefulness versus the
risk of prejudice, waste or confusion).
67 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1975).
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ysis was developed.6" The circuit court stated that a court must first
inquire into the reliability of the scientific process or technique used
to generate the novel scientific information:
the reliability assessment does not require, although it does
permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community. The district court in
assessing reliability may examine a variety of factors in addition to scientific acceptance. In many cases, however, the acceptance factor may well be decisive, or nearly so ....

On the

other hand, a known technique which has been able to attract
only minimal support within
the scientific community is likely
69
to be found unreliable.
The Third Circuit declared that where the novel science has no
prior litigation record to establish its acceptance or reliability, the
court can then examine other factors, including the comparison of
the novel technique with established scientific analysis techniques,
review of specialized literature on the technique, existence of critical
analysis of the technique by the scientific community, the expert's
professional stature and qualifications, and the novel technique's error rate and the type of errors.7 °
The second step requires balancing the possibility that the
novel scientific information or technique would overwhelm or confuse the jury against the court's assessment of the technique's reliability. In contrast to enumerating the factors to be used in
performing the reliability analysis, the Third Circuit provided no
meaningful guidelines or mandatory procedures for trial courts to
follow in performing the balancing analysis, with the exception of
reference to an in limine hearing at or before trial. 7 1 The balancing
analysis may or may not be different from the court's determination
of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by other dangers, such as undue delay, waste of time or
753 F.2d at 1236-37.
Id. at 1238.
70 Id. at 1238-39. For a list of other factors which may be utilized in determining
reliability, see 3 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER, 02[03], at 702-4 1 to 702-43 (1990).
The Downing "reliability as a condition of admissibility" analysis differs from the
Frye standard which required a scientific "nose-counting" to determine sufficient
acceptance within the relevant scientific community.
71 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1240-41. Little guidance was provided with the exception that the Third Circuit acknowledged the "presumption of helpfulness" accorded expert testimony under Rule 702 and determined that district court
holdings concerning the admission or exclusion of novel scientific evidence would
be reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" standard.
68
69
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needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 7 2
The circuit court noted that the final element of the analysis
requires that there be a sufficient nexus between the proffered scientific technique or result and the actual facts of the case, such that
the information will aid the jury in its fact finding function. This
"relevancy" test, the court held, will require an on-the-record detailed offer of proof, and failure to tender such offer renders the
expert testimony excludable. 73
Since 1985, the Third Circuit has consistently followed this
three pronged analysis, reversing and remanding cases which do not
closely adhere to the guidelines. In fact, the court's most recent decisions on this issue have expanded the scope of the Downing analysis and have held that when a scientist's methodology is attacked,
rather than the underlying data, the trial judge must analyze the information by looking to the Downing reliability, relevance, and assistance to the jury analysis before ruling on the testimony's
7
admissibility. 1
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia developed a
different standard in a case involving the causal relationship between long-term dermal absorption of paraquat and the development of pulmonary fibrosis. In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. ,7 the
defendant argued that the plaintiff's proffered expert's opinion on
causation was not generally accepted in the medical and scientific
community and was sufficiently novel to warrant exclusion. 6 After
carefully reviewing all of the scientific evidence, the court
concluded:
[A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by
72 FED. R. EvID. 403 can be a separate basis for exclusion, particularly with regard to the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403 provides in full:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading of the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of evidence.
If the testimony survives the rigors of Rule 702 and 703 analysis, however, "Rule
403 is an unlikely basis for exclusion." DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical,
Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir. 1990).
73 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242. See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381,
383 (1 st Cir. 1979) (offer of proof insufficient to establish relevancy of the proffered
expert testimony to the case at hand,. as well as insufficient to establish that the
subject matter was beyond the knowledge of ordinary lay persin jurors).
74 See DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954-55; In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829,
857 (3d Cir. 1990). (both courts held that in making reliability determinations,
courts should err on the side of admission rather than exclusion).
75 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
76 Id. at 1535.
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animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify
that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the
basic methodology employed to reach such conclusion is
sound, such as [the] use of tissue samples, standard tests, and
patient examination, products liability law does not preclude
recovery until a "statistically significant" number of people
have been injured or until science has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the
chemical. In a courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to
recover in a tort suit of this type is not scientific certainty but
legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the
expert testimony that paraquat more likely than not caused
[the plaintiff's] injury, the fact that another jury might reach
the opposite conclusion or that science would require more
evidence before conclusively considering the causation question resolved is irrelevant. That [the plaintiff's] case may have
been the first of its exact type, or that his doctors may have
been the first alert enough to recognize such a case, does not
mean that the testimony of those doctors, who are concededly
well qualified in their fields, should not have been admitted. 7
Consequently, this "legal sufficiency" standard, which potentially ignores probabilistic evidence, could conceivably allow a court to rely
solely on the opinion of one physician or scientist. 78 Moreover, in a
more recent case, this same court held that it was not obligated to
accept, without further investigation, every technically qualified expert witness.7 9
Within this framework, an examination of the unsettled state of
the law in New Jersey is helpful. Historically, New Jersey courts
have followed the general acceptance standard to test the reliability
of expert testimony:
To meet the requirement that the expert's testimony be sufficiently reliable, defense counsel must show that the testimony
77 Id. at 1535-36. See also Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 737
F. Supp. 1117 (D. Idaho 1990) (court distinguished "legal sufficiency" from "scientific certainty" holding that the latter is not required by law, which employs the
"more likely than not" standard).

78 Various commentators believe this approach creates a substantial opportunity
for abuse in the admission of novel scientific theories. For a critique of Ferebee and

its progeny, see Brennan, supra note 6, at 494-501. Other jurisdictions, however,

have followed Ferebee. See e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741
(lth Cir.), reh'g denied, 795 F.2d 89 (lth Cir.), cert. denied., 479 U.S. 950 (1986)
(applied Ferebee to a case involving the teratogenic effects of a spermicide); Christopherson v. Allied Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1990) (applied Ferebee to a
wrongful death case involving exposure to toxic fumes).
79

Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829

(D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989).
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satisfies New Jersey's standard of acceptability for scientific evidence . . . . The technique or mode of analysis used by the
expert must have a sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results so as to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth.8"

Thus, NewJersey courts have been inclined to examine carefully the
underlying basis, technique or mode of analysis to ensure that the
technique is reasonably reliable. In those instances where courts
have found that the expert's opinion was nothing more than a bare
conclusion, unsupported by appropriate and reliable data, the testimony has been deemed an inadmissible "net opinion."8"
Several recent decisions, however, indicate that in the area of
causation, New Jersey may be restructuring its standard on the admissibility of expert witness testimony beyond the general acceptance standard. For instance, in Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp. ,2 a
toxic tort case involving the causal relationship between
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) exposure and colon cancer, the trial
judge excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's only causation expert, a biochemist specializing in cancer research. The court found
that the witness was not qualified to render an opinion on the causation of the plaintiff's illness and that the proofs relied upon by the
witness indicated nothing more than a novel scientific opinion which
80 State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 209-10, 478 A.2d 364, 380 (1984) (citations omitted). In Kelly, the expert testimony discussed the existence of "battered woman
syndrome". See also Windmere, Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 105 NJ. 373, 386, 522 A.2d
405, 412 (1987) (general acceptance of voiceprint analysis "is a critical factor in
finding that there is sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably
reliable results"); Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984) (general
acceptance of breathalyzer analysis); State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 443 A.2d 1020
(1982) (general acceptance of psychiatric testimony about rapist characteristics);
State v. Hurd, 86 NJ. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (general acceptance of testimony
enhanced by hypnosis).
81 See Matter of Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196, 564 A.2d 1184 (1989) (doctor's
opinion on patient was unsubstantiated by the evidence and excludable as a net
opinion); Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91, 477 A.2d 1246, 1253 (1984) (expert's opinion, unsupported by sufficient facts constituted "bare conclusion," inadmissible as a net opinion); Bowen v. Bowen, 96 N.J. 36, 49-50, 473 A.2d 73, 80
(1984) (expert's opinion, based on experience alone without any factual basis, is a
net opinion); Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524, 435 A.2d 1150 (1981) (net
opinion rule bars an expert's bare conclusions unsubstantiated by factual data);
Pearson v. St. Paul, 220 N.J. Super. 110, 116, 531 A.2d 744, 747 (App. Div. 1987)
(medical expert's opinion not considered a net opinion because it was adequately
supported by facts and reasonable expert assumptions); Correa v. Maggiore, 196
N.J. Super. 273, 282-83, 482 A.2d 192, 196-97 (App. Div. 1984) (expert's opinion,
supported by experience, architect's plans, and established procedures, does not
constitute an inadmissible net opinion).
82 225 NJ. Super. 485, 542 A.2d 975 (Law Div. 1988).
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was not generally accepted by even a substantial minority of the relevant scientific community.8 3 The appellate court reversed and remanded on two grounds. First, the court found that the biochemist
was qualified to express novel medical expert opinions on causation,
provided that the proffered opinion was based on adequate experience, training or education of the witness, and the opinion was not
"illogical, outlandish or totally speculative such that no reasonable
jury could accept the opinion."'8 4 Secondly, the court rejected the
general acceptance standard and adopted the broad proposition
that "[s]tudies establishing a statistically sound causal relationship
between a chemical and human cancer may be supportive of a causation theory, notwithstanding the fact that a majority of the relevant
disciplines may not have yet expressed agreement with a particular
study." 8 5 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this concept is that,
according to the court, the admission of expert testimony on novel
scientific evidence would be reviewed under a relevancy analysisprobative value weighed against the dangers of admission. 8 6 The
concurring 8 7 and dissenting" opinions clearly questioned the maId. at 500, 542 A.2d at 980, 983.
Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36, 41, 576 A.2d 4, 6
(App. Div. 1990).
85 Id. at 51, 576 A.2d at 11-12. In addition, the majority opinion cited Ferebee
v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062
(1984), in support of the principle that a well-reasoned opinion based upon the
expert's education, training and experience should not be excluded merely because
the opinion is not generally accepted in the scientific community. Id. at 53, 576
A.2d at 13. The court asserted that the credibility, probative value, and weight of
the expert testimony would be decided by the jury. Id. at 48, 576 A.2d at 10.
86 Id. at 54, 576 A.2d at 13 (citingJ. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EviDENCE, 02[03] (1988)). The court provides an interesting discussion of the scientist's use of "probable," versus "possible," as opposed to terms of legal
significance, such as reasonable probability. The court's implied message - do not
get caught up in phraseology; determine whether the expert's opinion concludes
that exposure probably caused the cancer in question. Id. at 55-56, 576 A.2d at 1415.
87 Judge Stern's concurring opinion agreed with the majority that the general
acceptance standard is too narrow a governing standard for admission of "causation" evidence in toxic tort cases, as opposed to the reliability of a scientifically
novel device, technique or mode of analysis. Judge Stern diverged from the majority opinion on the grounds that it was the trial judge's responsibility to determine
whether the proffered expert testimony was sufficiently reliable to assist the jury.
Judge Stern emphasized that it was the trial court's decision and there was the possibility that further evidence would have been produced to render the proffered
testimony as to causation more reliable. Id. at 58-59, 576 A.2d at 15-17 (Stern, J.,
concurring).
88 Judge Havey's dissenting opinion criticized the majority's use of scientific
"nose-counting" and "general acceptance" tests to evaluate causation in toxic tort
cases. In contrast, Judge Havey supported a case-by-case analysis of all factual and
scientific bases to determine reasonable reliability. Id. at 65-67. The dissent was
83
84
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jority's standard of review and rejected most novel theories as unsupported net opinions.
In accord with Rubanick is Landrigan v. Celotex Corp. ,9 wherein a
different appellate division panel affirmed the exclusion of expert
testimony on the causal connection between asbestos exposure and
colon cancer because the testimony consisted of unsupported net
opinions. The court concluded that:
[when causation] lies beyond the outskirts of medical knowledge, and plaintiff's proofs are simply incapable of engaging
the reasoning processes of a jury . . ., the fact that causation
cannot be reasonably demonstrated by presently available evidence is no justification for allowing a jury to guess its way to a
result.9 °
Accordingly, the New Jersey decisions on the admissibility of expert
testimony on novel scientific evidence have left many unanswered
questions. These questions include the scope ofjudicial review, the
procedural test for unreasonable reliance, the procedural validity of
an in limine review of scientific evidence and the precise standard for
determining the reliability of scientific causation evidence. The only
clear answer seems to be that all available scientific evidence on the
causation issue will need to be presented, reviewed and analyzed to
determine its admissibility.
3.

Types of Scientific Studies Which May Establish
Causation

The importance of a multi-disciplinary presentation of scientific studies and data is essential to the admissibility of the proffered causation testimony. Two of the major scientific methods
of establishing causation, epidemiology and animal studies, are
discussed herein along with other methods, in order to provide
the legal practitioner with working knowledge of the methods.
concerned that once a technique was deemed "generally accepted," its reliability
and test results would be professed by judicial notice, thus obviating the need for
proof in every case. The dissent would exclude the proffered causation testimony
because it was not supported by a single scientific study and had no factual basis.
Id. at 63, 576 A.2d at 18 (Havey, J., dissenting).
89 243 N.J. Super. 449, 579 A.2d 1268 (App. Div. 1990). See also Vuocolo v.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 240 N.J. Super. 289, 298-300, 573 A.2d 196, 20102 (App. Div. 1990) (expert testimony considered a net opinion because increased
risk of disease could not be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
or probability).
90 Landrigan, 243 N.J. Super. at 461-62, 579 A.2d at 1274.
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a.

Epidemiological Studies

Epidemiology is the study of disease and its incidence or occurrence in human populations. Epidemiologists study groups of
people to determine statistically significant correlations between
certain diseases and personal characteristics, habits or exposures
to different substances. 9 ' Epidemiological studies, as in other
scientific fields, can be prospective or retrospective in nature.
The retrospective study uses data already generated (for instance
if the symptom or illness has manifested itself), and the epidemiologist compares the affected group with an unaffected control
group and seeks a common factor or exposure to explain the occurrence of the illness in the affected group. In contrast, prospective studies track two groups of people over a given period
of time, often years, and records the incidence or occurrence of a
particular illness. One group consists of persons who were exposed to the substance and the other group, the control group,
consisting of unexposed persons.
The prospective study is preferred over the retrospective
study because retrospective studies are vulnerable to bias in the
selection of the study groups and the significant inability to control outside influences and factors. Nevertheless, retrospective
studies continue to be performed because they are relatively inexpensive, can be completed over a short period of time, and
avoid the ethical concerns of exposing persons without disease to
a suspected harmful agent.9 2
In the context of toxic tort cases, epidemiology attempts to
identify a statistical relationship between exposure to a particular
toxic substance and the incidence of disease by comparing exposed and unexposed (control) groups. The term "expected
mortality" rate refers to the disease mortality rate for the control
group, whereas "observed mortality" rate applies to the disease
mortality rate of the exposed group. If the mortality rate for a
given disease is the same for both groups, the "risk-ratio" or
"relative risk" of observed-to-expected mortality is 1.0. From
91 For a general discussion of epidemiology and the use of epidemiological studies in litigation, see Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 17, at 732; Dore, A Proposed Standardfor Evaluating the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Toxic Tort and Other Personal
Injury Cases, 28 HOWARD L.J. 677 (1985); Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in DemonstratingCause-in-Fact,7 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 429 (1983); Hall &
Silbergeld, ReappraisingEpidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
441 (1983); Heafey, supra note 17, at 673; K.J. ROTHMAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY
(1986).
92 Heafey, supra note 17, at 674.
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the relative risk figure, an epidemiologist can calculate an "attributable risk" factor-that percentage of the diseased person which
is statistically attributable to exposure to the toxic substance.
Whether these risk figures constitute a "statistically significant association" becomes the crucial issue with regard to admissibility
of the scientific evidence.93 Courts have been fairly consistent on
what relative risk figure is statistically significant for the purposes
of the admissibility of an expert epidemiological witness'
testimony. 94
Causation based on epidemiological studies, as opposed to
other methodologies, is considered to be of prime significance in
determining whether the plaintiff's burden of proof has been met
in certain jurisdictions.9 5 In some cases, the plaintiff's only causation evidence may consist of an epidemiologist's testimony
proffered to show a causal connection in probabilistic terms.
Courts are suspicious of statistical evidence which falls short of
proving causation by reasonable medical probability in a particular individual. 96 Many courts, however, will not reject epidemio93 Epidemiology is by no means this simple. A plethora of additional factors
must be considered by the epidemiologist, including confidence levels (a mathematical expression of the magnitude of possible errors); the method of study (cohort vs. retrospective case-control); sampling errors (small sample of the relevant
population); significance testing (through the use of a "P value" to determine the
probability that an observed difference between two groups is or is not due to a
random chance); and bias (a systematic error or distortion).
94 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 785
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiffs must prove at least a twofold increase in the occurrence
of the disease); Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1434 (W.D. Mo. 1986),
aft'd, 830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987) (relative risk of two or less proves exposure is
not probable cause of disease); Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087,
1092 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655
(4th Cir. 1987) (risk ratios of 1.3 and 1.9 insufficient to prove probable causation,
even though the statistical evidence supported a greater than two-fold increased
risk); Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (a relative risk
in excess of two, the upper limit of the baseline risk, is necessary to prove
causation).
95 See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989),
modified, 884 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir.), rehk'g denied en banc, 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.),
reh 'g denied, 886 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (causation evidence from epidemiological studies is the most reliable causation evidence;
thus expert opinion not based on epidemiological study evidence is inadmissible to
establish causation); but cf. Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1094
(D. Md. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir. 1987) (presentation of epidemiological studies is not flatly required in order
for plaintiff to meet his burden of proof).
96 See Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 116 N.J. 126, 139-41 (1989) (requirement of
reasonable medical probability of the future incidence of disease). The exclusion
of statistical evidence also occurs because of the inability to prove actual cause and
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logical evidence on this basis alone and are willing to examine
the scientific underpinnings of the epidemiological study.
Standards for review of epidemiologic evidence are developing and substantial attention has been paid to the subject. 9 ' The
better standard requires an analysis of all reliability factors and
places special emphasis on the relative risk and attributable risk
figures. To support a finding of legal causation, one commentator writes that the attributable risk must exceed fifty percent in
any given case:
Conceptually, the finder of fact must decide whether it is more
likely than not that an individual plaintiff contracted a specific
disease as a result of exposure to a factor for which the defendant is legally responsible. From an epidemiologic perspective, the question has two parts: (1) is the factor causally
related to the disease, and (2) is the attributable risk greater
than [50%]?98

There are few New Jersey opinions on this issue. Until recently, the
opinions have been consistent in requiring an attributable risk figure 99in excess of fifty percent or a relative risk figure in excess of
2.0.
Several recent federal court decisions have dealt with an epidemiological study technique known as "meta-analysis." The metaanalysis technique combines the results of different epidemiological
effect in the individual case from a statistical study. See, e.g., Robinson v. United
States, 533 F. Supp. 320, 330 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (plaintiff unable to prove from
statistical evidence that she contracted Guillain-Barre syndrome from swine flu
vaccination).
97 See supra note 91.
98 Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 17, at 767. See also Lilienfeld & Black, The Epidemiologist in Court: Some Comments, 123 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 961, 963 (1986) (a relative risk figure of 1.5 allows an inference of attributable risk figure of 33%, which
means there is a less likely than not causal connection).
99 See, e.g., Mauro, 116 NJ. at 144-145 (epidemiologic evidence must establish
reasonable medical probability of incidence of future disease); Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 449, 459 (App. Div. 1990) (a relative risk figure of 1.55
and an attributable risk figure of roughly 35% was insufficient to establish causation
in an epidemiological study which found 59 deaths where 38 were expected). But
compare, Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 248 NJ. Super. 446, 591 A.2d 671 (App.
Div. 1991). (Expert who was a medical doctor and epidemiologist could proffer
causation testimony regarding plaintiff's colon cancer and exposure to asbestos
even though the opinion was based in part on epidemiological studies which
showed a risk factor of less than 2.0 because the studies were offered as only one of
the bases of the expert's opinion and not offered as substantive evidence. The
court distinguished Landrigan and stated that the expert substantiated her opinion
by her own clinical findings, thus the opinion was not a net opinion. Accordingly,
there was no need to establish a fixed number as the operative risk factor
limitation).
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studies, reanalyzes the combined data and determines whether the
aggregated data provides proof of causation. The courts which have
addressed the reliability of this novel[scientific technique, as well as
the expert's methodology in performing the meta-analysis, have
either remanded for specific findings on reliability issues' 0 0 or have
rejected the meta-analysis findings.
b.

Animal Studies

Animal studies are often the only evidence available to determine whether certain substances are toxic to humans. By way of
exposure, observation, assumption, calculation and extrapolation
to human beings, animal studies attempt to provide necessary
causation evidence through a dose-response procedure. In
animal studies, however, there are many problems attendant to
the assumptions, variations between animals and humans, and
extrapolation of figures. The studies are therefore suspected by
the courts as having less reliability. 10 '
In the Bendectin cases, the courts evaluated the use of in vitro and in vivo animal studies to show teratogenic effects, and concluded that the studies were incapable of establishing causation
in human beings because of the greater body of contrary epidemiologic evidence.' 0 2 In the Agent Orange cases, animal studies
were found inadmissible to establish causation chiefly because of
the extraordinarily high dosages given to the biological subjects
in the studies and because of the differences between animals
100 See In re Paoli, 916 F.2d 829, 856-59 (3d Cir. 1990); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
v. Stuart Pharmaceutical, 1990 W.L. 159909 (D.N.J. 1990) (rejecting meta-analysis
results because of faulty underlying study data); MacNeil-P.P.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 755 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (rejecting meta-analysis
results because the results of the studies upon which the meta-analysis was done
were erroneous).
101 For a general discussion of the use of animal studies in toxic tort cases, see
Landau & O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibility of Animal Studies to Prove
Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 IDAHo L. REV. 521 (1988).
102 DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 950 n.10 (3d Cir.
1990). Accord Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313-14 (5th
Cir.), modified on reh'g, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1511
(1990) (recognizing the limited utility of animal studies to prove causation, but rejecting the proffered animal study evidence due to lack of supporting epidemiological evidence); Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823,
830 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989) (rejecting in vivo and in vitro
animal studies as incapable of proving causation in humans); Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting in vivo and in
vitro animal studies as establishing causation in the absence of supporting epidemiological studies). But cf. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 506 A.2d
1100, 1108 (D.C. App. 1986) (allowing in vitro and in vivo animal study data).
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and human beings."0 ' In two PCB cases, the plaintiffs' expert
witnesses relied, inter alia, on studies showing PCB-produced
cancer in experimental animals. The courts concluded that the
reliability factors in animal studies must be more closely explored
at the time of trial.' 0 4 In contrast, in cases involving various
other substances, courts have allowed expert witness testimony
regarding animal studies to prove the carcinogenic effects of
chemicals on humans.' 0 5 In general, most courts have dealt with
animal studies by carefully evaluating the studies for appropriate
relevance and reliability.
c.

Other Methods

There are various other methods which scientists use to develop causation evidence. For example, the collection of case
histories, or anecdotal data, and reports of disease after exposure
are often used by physicians to establish the causal link, even
though other naturally occurring environmental factors may produce the same disease in the general population. Despite the obvious problems of this approach, some courts have accepted the
use of anecdotal data while other courts have rejected it. 10 6 Recalculations of data from epidemiologic studies are sometimes
offered to support causation, but are often questioned because
the recalculations frequently involve the rediagnosis of cases
from the original database or because the interpretation methods
103 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241
(D.C.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied., 487 U.S. 1234
(1988) (animal results found so misleading under Rule 403 that they could not
serve as an acceptable predicate for an expert opinion under Rule 703). See also
Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987) (evidentiary problems
encountered with studies of toxicity of herbicide in rats).
104 In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853 n.27; Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J.
Super. 36, 52-53 (App. Div. 1990).
105 See, e.g., Villari v. Terminix Int'l, 692 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (animal
studies concerning pesticide toxicity); Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 639 F.
Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (animal studies concerning smokeless tobacco
effects).
106 See Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1987)
(expert's reliance on plaintiff's medical records, scientific studies and case histories
is sufficient to establish causation question of fact); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (court
accepted three case histories as sufficient to establish causation issue of fact for the
jury to resolve). Compare In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 840, 854 (3d Cir. 1990) (better
record necessary to evaluate rejection of case histories of similar exposure incidents
in Japan in 1968 and Taiwan in 1979), and Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718,
722 (6th Cir. 1989) (evidence of cases of dermatomyositis allegedly from swine flu
vaccination rejected under the general acceptance test as inadmissible to establish
causation).
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are deemed unreliable.' ° " Finally, as another method of establishing causation, courts have been asked to examine chemically
similar substances and draw analogous conclusions. Most courts,
however, have either8 rejected the proffer or found the applica10
tion of limited use.

V.

CONCLUSION

The complex issues presented in toxic tort and hazardous
substance litigation mandate the use of expert witness scientific
testimony. Such witnesses are required to sift through the myriad of studies, hypotheses and methodologies in an attempt to
identify and simplify the basis for finding causation, or lack
thereof, by the trier of fact. All courts agree that certain rules
must govern the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. The
courts disagree, however, on what constitutes the appropriate
standard of review and the extent ofjudicial participation in making such admissibility determinations. In the absence of specific
amendments to the rules of evidence, a definitive United States
Supreme Court decision, concrete guidelines from appellate
courts with consistent application by trial courts, or the development of a uniform standard of review, the use of novel scientific
expert opinions and evidence, will surely provide lawyers and
judges with fascinating legal and scientific controversies into the
next century.
107 See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1985) (expert's
epidemiological meta-analysis results rejected because of the expert's
"rediagnosis" of several diagnoses in the underlying data base); Gaul v. United
States, 582 F. Supp. 1122, 1128-29 (D. Del. 1984) (expert's epidemiological study
reanalysis rejected due to expert's use of different data than was utilized in the
underlying studies); O'Gara v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 786, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(expert witness meta-analysis findings insufficient to establish causation because the
expert's assumptions and data selection were suspect).
1o8 Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 646 F. Supp. 867, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (highly speculative nature of the analogies renders them inadmissible); Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829-30 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989)
(chemical structure analysis theory, providing that drugs with a similar chemical
structure produce analogous effects, is of limited value and does not, by itself, establish causation). Cf. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 506 A.2d
1100 (D.C. App. 1986) (chemical structure analysis alone cannot establish causation, unless supported by other scientific study data).

